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ABSTRACT
Production of Integrated Circuits (ICs) has been largely strengthened by globalization. System-
on-chip providers are capable of utilizing many different providers which can be responsible for a
single task. This horizontal structure drastically improves to time-to-market and reduces manufac-
turing cost. However, untrust of oversea foundries threatens to dismantle the complex economic
model currently in place. Many Intellectual Property (IP) consumers become concerned over what
potentially malicious or unspecified logic might reside within their application. This logic which
is inserted with the intention of causing harm to a consumer has been referred to as a Hardware
Trojan (HT). To help IP consumers, researchers have looked into methods for finding HTs. Such
methods tend to rely on high-level information relating to the circuit, which might not be accessi-
ble. There is a high possibility that IP is delivered in the gate or layout level. Some services and
image processing methods can be leveraged to convert layout level information to gate-level, but
such formats are incompatible with detection schemes that require hardware description language.
By leveraging standard graph and dynamic programming algorithms a set of tools is developed
that can help bridge the gap between gate-level netlist access and HT detection. To help in this
endeavor this dissertation focuses on several problems associated with reverse engineering ICs.
Logic signal identification is used to find malicious signals, and logic desynthesis is used to extract
high level details. Each of the proposed method have their results analyzed for accuracy and run-
time. It is found that method for finding logic tends to be the most difficult task, in part due to the
degree of heuristic’s inaccuracy. With minor improvements moderate sized ICs could have their
high-level function recovered within minutes, which would allow for a trained eye or automated
methods to more easily detect discrepancies within a circuit’s design.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Integrated Circuits (ICs) are more prevalent in today’s society than ever. Thanks to society’s grow-
ing demand for smart devices, the periodic improvement in design/cost, and the ability to out-
source parts of IC production, the amount of applications that rely on ICs has drastically increased.
However, this large influx of smart devices has lead consumers to doubt the integrity of IC man-
ufacturers. An in-depth analysis of the infrastructure surrounding IC manufacturing needs to be
performed. This chapter presents a broad overview of the state of hardware manufacturing.
1.1 Chip Manufacturing
A major driving force behind the IC market today is globalization. Perhaps the biggest benefit
is gobalization’s allowance for a convenient opportunity to match IC developers with willing and
capable IC manufacturers. As it so happens, globalization strongly supports the horizontal model
for chip assembly; each step of IC development can be performed by a different group. The
horizontal model then allows companies to focus their resources on their chosen specialization.
Due to these factors globalization decreases a chip’s cost and Time-To-Market (TTM). At present,
from the economic point of view the amount of work that is required for modern chip production
is not necessarily feasible for any one company to oversee. In fact, many IC providers rely on
a contract based method for IC production. Even companies capable of partial in-house chip
manufacturing tend to rely on third party resources at some stages of chip design [1]. Overall it is
commonly accepted that globalization increase availability of ICs.
Globalization is a double-edged sword. As with any process that involves many steps, we expose
our ICs to a higher possibility for accruing defects, and overall, the chance for error is increased
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due to having differing contributors for each step. The complex contribution model involved in
chip manufacturing also makes detecting such defects in a timely manner more difficult. Although
techniques such as Automated Test Pattern Generation (ATPG) has helped improved quality con-
trol [2], rare triggering errors or defects that reduce a products life can be hard to adjust and test for.
Multi-state chip designs significantly increases the chance of a compatibility issue, where Intellec-
tual Property (IP) developed by different groups might not be able to work together properly or
as intended. Companies might be hesitant to share potentially sensitive information even through
secure communication channels. Such companies might not even disclose detrimental corner cases
that need to be handled by other IP on a large System-on-Chip (SoC). Additionally if chip develop-
ment on large systems does go wrong, determining the guilty party becomes much more difficult.
The resulting finger pointing can be costly to small businesses that might not be at fault, which can
deter more honest producers from entering the market in the first place. All of these issues could
motivate governments to step in and subject companies to more regulations, thereby costing small
businesses even more money and time. Further more all these detriments leads to the inevitable
concern that globalization overall reduces the consumer trust in ICs.
As globalization increases the throughput of ICs, a new form of service has gradually been intro-
duced to the IC community, that of Third-Party IP (3PIP) vendors [3]. Such vendors will supply
customers with made-to-order IC designs. The quality and level of detail of such products varies
greatly. 3PIPs can be given at a level as high as Verilog or as simple as layout. Due in part to
globalization the bulk of SoC development relies heavily on these services. Benefits of third-party
production includes reduction in design overhead, fabrication costs, and TTM, while the draw-
backs include flawed cores, or worse, cores with inserted malicious logic triggerable by malicious
users. The required vetting of products before use/fabrication falls to the IP consumer, which might
not be feasible given their low-level understanding of the product.
The government has already taken an interest into the on goings of electronic part providers. Such
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providers have been investigated for potential selling of counterfeit military-grade goods [4]. What
was found was quite disturbing; not only would used parts be sold as if new, but quite a few sold
parts were non-existant, fabrications created by requesting bogus part numbers. Luckily, an array
of tests exist to help determine the quality of such products. This allows malicious distributors
to be dealt with. However, there is a lack of methods for determining whether an IC was created
maliciously, which leaves malicious IP providers free-reign to provide bad parts.
1.2 Hardware Trojans
As mentioned previously the reliance on third party facilities leads to the potential for many dif-
ferent groups involved in assembling even one IC, which is why a major threat to IC consumers is
that of unspecified chip functionality. Due to lack of communication between parties, or that of the
desire to sabotage another entity’s IC, an IC can now more than ever be subjected to failure when in
use. Even Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) are susceptible post-assembly, since FPGAs
can be programmed with malicious pieces of code. During behavior specification and code syn-
thesis the code is vulnerable; the tools used to generate such content may in fact be compromised
themselves [5]. Specifications received by third party resources could also have something like a
backdoor that can allow users to gain more control over a system than was originally anticipated.
In the research community any malignant circuitry that is incorporated into an IC to alter its be-
havior from specification in any way is referred to as a hardware Trojan. Hardware Trojans most
often consist of two major characteristics: the trigger and the payload. Figure 1.1 gives a simple
example of a hardware Trojan, assuming that propagating the signal z to z’ without manipulation
is the desirable behavior of the circuit.





Figure 1.1: A simple Hardware Trojan.
can range from the input of a particular input, a sequence of particular input vectors, or even a
required amount of clock cycles. Whatever the trigger, the event itself needs to be rare, otherwise
the Trojan may be detected in functional testing of the chip. In the event of an IC user discovering
a hardware Trojan, the blow back for the hardware Trojan developer would be devastating. After
detection the best case for the Trojan developer is that the effort they put into developing the Trojan
would be wasted since the chip would no longer be used. This spurs Trojan designers to develop
“stealthy Trojans”.
The payload, the most important part of a hardware Trojan, determines what adverse function-
ality the IC will perform. The payload can range from leaking sensitive on chip information to
preventing use by stalling or outputting incorrect values. In the sample Trojan in Figure 1.1 the
payload corrupts the z signal. After triggering the Trojan in this example can potentially cause IP
consumers issues either at the current clock cycles output or potentially in later clock cycles.
1.3 Introduction to Reverse Engineering
To talk about circuit protection it is helpful to diverge and discuss a similar topic, reverse engineer-
ing. Reverse engineering refers to the process through which analysis of an object can allow one
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to infer the process through which the object in question was created. Typically reverse engineer-
ing is looked down upon in industry due to the negative association with that of piracy. Although
the way in which products are reverse engineered might be legal, how such information garnered
from reverse engineering methods is leveraged typically is illegal. However, the development and
results of reverse engineering can have a tremendous, beneficial impact on the IC community.
A large factor that positively impacted early development of hardware-level reverse engineering
was the threat of hardware Trojans. Many early hardware Trojans were inserted into Finite State
Machines (FSMs), which could allow, with certain transitions, behavior not within the original IC’s
specification or side-channel activity that could leak sensitive information. To help detect Trojans
methods for finding such logic structures were proposed. An exemplary solution used the topology
and the knowledge of control signals to help cluster signals into words [6]. Conceptually each word
would form its own logical FSM. This idea stemmed from the concept that words within a netlist
would have their datapath controlled by a similar, if not the same, set of signals. This method
initially showed promise, in that many of the words generated were small, which allows users to
quickly determine their functionality.
5
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
As mentioned in the previous chapter restoring the trust in IP suppliers can be achieved by assisting
IP consumers in determining and potentially verifying chip functionality. Although in some cases
a straightforward design comparison method could fulfill this request, a more sophisticated design
analysis tool is needed. The tool should be capable of using a recovered gate-level netlist as the
input. The desired method should then recover the chips full functionality. Relying on these tools,
users can verify the trustworthiness of purchased chips. Methods have been proposed to classify
chips with malicious IP or to even fix the malicious sections of circuits [7]. However, typically
these methods have been shown to be inaccurate [8].
Many works suggest that in order to find malicious components of a circuit, the user must first un-
derstand the function of the parts of the circuit. The process of extracting the high-level description
of a circuit is the process called reverse engineering. To fulfill this need, proposed methods exist
that map circuit components to a known set of components (i.e. a component table) by leveraging
the technique of graph isomorphism [9]. Graph isomorphism has not been proven, as of the time
of this thesis, to have a polynomial run time, so this method tends to be slow. Furthermore, some
difficulties associated with this form of reverse engineering comes from the lack of knowledge of
the processes used to generate the core. With unfamiliar processes the set of known components
can be rendered useless. Fortunately, research has further developed to not rely on component
tables [10, 11]. However, many methods for reverse engineering today still have drawbacks, either
only partial recovery of chip functionality (e.g. detecting only data paths) or bad performance (e.g.
poor runtime versus accuracy trade-off).
This chapter will focus on the previous efforts made in an attempt to restore foundry trust. It
will emphasize the need for Trojan detection, while discussing proposed techniques that can help
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prevent them. The section also covers the challenges associated with function recovery due in part
to modern IP protection. This chapter will show the indirect link between the two problems, Trojan
prevention and IP protection, and how they can, at times, be in direct conflict.
2.1 Split Manufacturing
In an early attempt to prevent information leakage using hardware Trojans, methods were proposed
that implemented extra safety circuitry. Some of these extra security modules were referred to
as guards or gates, and they were designed to limit the ability of inter-module communications.
In [12] a hardware guard was designed to examine communication between the memory and CPU
core. The guard was used to prevent sensitive data being extraneously written to the memory. The
protection was done by forming a shadow set of memory operations that could be double checked
with the original set of memory operations. However, their method did not prevent DoS, and the
integrity of the guard was never taken into consideration.
To alleviate the concerns over potentially bad guards a method called SHADE [13] leveraged two
guards that were presumably fabricated at non-colluding foundries that encrypted and decrypted
the data that goes to memory such that activation of a Trojan becomes hard. Also to counteract
DoS, the “outer guard” analyzed “heartbeats”. If the “inner guard” takes too long to respond or was
not encrypting the heartbeats correctly, the outer guard detects an attack. The concept of multiple
non-colluding foundries is a tough requirement to meet and is not completely original. Split manu-
facturing [14] merges two pieces of circuitry to prevent foundries from understanding the intended
IC. The cost associated with such a system could be quite high due to extra assembly required
and the high potential detrimental affects on performance. Worse off, SHADE stops computa-
tion and provided no real solutions for handling a failed heartbeat. The authors also implied that
the heartbeats needed to be adjusted as to prevent false triggers when the execution time lags for
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non-malicious reasons. If the bound on the heartbeat is too loose, attacks can still be done on the
IC. Lastly the authors have to assume that both the outer guard’s heartbeat sensor was accurately
produced and that the fabrication facilities were indeed non-colluding.
Other methods that rely on multiple non-colluding facilities have been proposed [15]. Such meth-
ods include fabricating full ICs and then compiling their output using a voting scheme. Such
methods incur a substantial area and power overhead and require advanced knowledge of the IP as
to provide differing ICs such that even if the foundries did decide to collude, the internal signals
would be difficult to match.
Some methods take advantage of faster than homegrown ICs and perform verification by using
trusted circuitry. In [16] the authors proposed a method to leverage 3PIP chips by proving that
the 3PIP’s results are accurate with the help of trusted, homegrown ICs. Several result-proving
methods analyzed in the paper allow for a faster than homegrown IC computation. This method
also creates a significant area and power overhead. Not only does this method require knowledge
of the high-level functionality, but IP producers would have to disclose the IP pertaining to final
IC, which many chip developers are hesitant to do. All of these methods have been classified as
passive, pre-silicon prevention schemes and require access to the original design, which might not
be available to the IC consumer.
2.2 From Silicon to Electrons
With the potential failure of hardware Trojan prevention many researchers looked to the possibility
of checking for Trojans in designs post-silicon. Many users might only have access to very low
level IC descriptions such as layout or just the fabricated chip. The fact that some ICs might
not be given to a user in a computer readable format, spurred researchers to look for methods of
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converting post-fabrication netlists into a machine readable low level description. Luckily several
methods and services exist for acquiring such a netlist [17, 18, 19]. Many of these methods tend
to be destructive (e.g. cross-sectioning, delayering, etc.). Such methods cause the IC to no longer
function. Typically the recovered design descriptions can be in the form of transistor-layout or
as high as a gate-level netlist containing the AND-OR gate information. Recovering higher level
information from such low level descriptions requires a significant amount of extra effort.
One of the many tools at the disposal of IC users in the hopes of IC description recovery is Scan-
ning Electron Microscopes (SEM). With many chips, preparation is needed to get a detailed image
of the IC. In a process called delayering a Printed Circuit Board (PCB) can be analyzed completely.
By alternating Hydrofluoric acid baths and Acetone baths a chip can be cleaned. The baths then
allow for each layer’s layout to be recovered with the use of a high resolution SEM [18]. Alter-
natively lasers, dremels, sandpaper, or Computer Numerical Control (CNC) mills can be used to
remove scanned portions to reveal the next layer for analysis with varying amount of accuracy/cost
associated with each method [20].
The biggest drawback to methods described above is their destructive nature. After the acid baths
large portion of metals will have been eaten away which renders the circuit largely useless. How-
ever, the acids are relatively easy to acquire and renting a SEM is inexpensive. Another benefit to
such a method is the short time required for recovery of small circuits. Notable Trojan detection
methods have shown effective by utilizing the process of delayering through the use of chemical
and imaging via a SEM alone [21].
Focused Ion Beams (FIBs) have been used to perform precise cross-sectional analysis [22]. This
cross-section allows for tools such as SEMs to find potential chip defects. However, FIBs can also
be used to mill part of the IC to probe internal signals of the IC. This microprobing allows one to
determine functionality of potentially camouflaged or obfuscated ICs. Methods to help prevent the
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recovery of sensitive on chip information have been proposed to counter FIB attacks. One example
include overlaying a mesh of signal carrying wires [23]. These signal carrying wires when cut will
corrupt parts of the circuit, making signal recovery impossible. Such methods have a high power
and area overhead, and counter attacks utilizing the geometry of the FIB exist [24].
One approach for recovering chip information while maintaining the functionality of the chip uses
X-ray to perform and micro computed tomography. Compared to SEM and microprobing the chip
is left in tact and has the potential to be reused [22, 25, 26]. The price is also comparable to
that of SEM [19]. Alternatively X-rays can be used to create a high resolution three dimensional
structure [27].
However, a large problem lies in the resolution. To get a high resolution the IC needs to be close
the x-ray emitter. The IC also needs to be able to rotate which might not be possible due to the
dimensions of the IC [28]. Sample preparation can allow the IC to be scanned at the cost of the IC.
A second problem is the IC design themselves. Materials resistant to x-rays (i.e. high-Z materials)
could be present. A stronger x-ray can penetrate such materials, but prolonged exposure to high
energy x-rays might have detrimental effects on the IC [26]. Also if the x-rays are too strong,
information about the remaining material might be lost due to a lack of contrast, and thereby
rendering the process useless. For this reason destructive IC recovery might be necessary.
2.3 IP Protection
With the efforts put into determining low-level functionality of chips a new problem came into the
realization. The ability for one to recover any information from a netlist allows users to recover
private or sensitive information that might be on the chip, which could include the layout of the
IC itself. With knowledge of the design the IC could unlawfully be duplicated allowing for a
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simple form of IP theft. Several approaches for preventing IP theft exist. The first of which is a
passive approach where the function of the netlist remains unchanged, while the chip should be
identifiable. Counterfeit ICs should be easily detected by this watermarking, but such methods
do not prevent or impede IP thieves. More active methods for IP theft prevention have also been
proposed. Both methods will be discussed in greater detail in this section.
2.3.1 Logic Locking
A more aggressive approach to preventing IP theft was that of Ending Piracy of Integrated Circuits
(EPIC) [29]. A TRNG was used to corrupt wires in the IC. Using a secure communication channel
the IP provider would communicate with the foundry and instruct them on programming the chip.
After which the chip should function as normal, while the foundry has little to no information
of the chip. Later methods would predict the optimal insertion spots to increase the difficulty of
reverse engineering [30].
Some techniques leveraged the concept of don’t care signals. The authors in [31] used analysis
of the IC specifications to improve protection methods. Non-affecting control signals are inserted
into the IC such that no extra functionality is included. This logic is made as complex as possible
by leveraging the knowledge of the IC and the logical function that particular wires have. However
methods such as these don’t protect the circuit from automated techniques that can detect and
remove such gates.
One tool used to help encrypt netlist is the use of a type of PUF called Random Unique Blocks
(RUBs). A RUB can be used to make chip specific keys that are required for unlocking of the
full functionality [32]. In this work RUBs were used with the intention of preventing a fabrication
facility from stealing the netlist design. The encryption design duplicated states of the FSM and
the RUB would be used to determine what key would be needed to leave the duplicated states. An
11
incorrect key entry would cause the FSM to lock and prevent further use, until the entire design
was reset. The authors in [32] acknowledge the fact that a reverse engineering attack on the FSM
would potentially be able to recover the design. The authors claimed that such a task would be
intractable but provided no evidence to support their claim.
A highly influential sequential obfuscation method proposed was hardware Protection through
obfuscation of Netlist (HARPOON) [1]. Their method broke up and locked parts of the netlist.
HARPOON focuses on limiting access to the original logical FSM by requiring an unlocking
sequence of inputs. To do so HARPOON expands the FSM’s state space. HARPOON then uses the
inserted states to corrupts parts of the circuit. The FSM is split into two main parts: the corrupting
part (obfuscation mode) and the non-corrupting part (normal mode). For an example FSM see
Figure 2.1. However, once the FSM’s state is within a correct state, normal circuit execution will
not cause circuit corruption. Fault-injection attacks [33, 34, 35] can be leveraged to prematurely










Figure 2.1: Simple example of a FSM generated by HARPOON. Red edges denote transitions that
prevent access to the original FSM. Blue edges allow for the unlocking or the correct use of the
original logical FSM.
Other IP Piracy prevention techniques leveraging temporal logic have been proposed [36, 37].
The authors in [36] focused on corrupting the logical FSM. The method inserts a few extra “State
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Elements” (SEs) to expand the state space. The starting state of the modified FSM is within an
unlocking FSM that accepts virtually any input and quickly moves the state to the starting state
of the original functioning FSM. However, the input in the unlocking FSM determines an internal
key that will be used for some transition in the original FSM. The wrong key will cause the FSM
to transition to an incorrect state. This can have dire consequences for an IP pirate that rips off the
IC with no regard to the correct sequence. However, the method is fairly easy to detect, and an
adversary can leverage a SAT-based attack (which will be described in further detail later) and the
scan chain to find the correct internal key thereby recovering the full unencrypted IP.
In [37] a static key is used to determine FSM traversal. An incorrect key would lead the FSM into
one of many black hole states (i.e. a state designed to corrupt the IC functionality while providing
no method to reach a non-corrupting state). To prevent a user from jumping to a non-black hole
state via a fault (a common attack strategy) each non-black hole state required the key to function
properly. The disadvantage to such an approach is that the method relies on a static key, so the use
of a scan chain could provide a user the ability to determine the key, with little concern as to the
actual temporal logic.
2.3.2 SAT-Based Attacks
Although methods for protecting circuits through obfuscation abound in modern research [29, 30,
38], such methods are completely or partially susceptible to combinatorial attacks proposed in
research [39, 40]. A state-of-the art model, typically referred to as a SAT attack, consists of a
unlocked black box that acts as an input output oracle that can be used to test potential solutions.
A second part to such models is that of a locked model that describes partial functionality of the
black box.
A SAT solver is used to generate a special input that distinguishes two keys by their resulting
13
outputs on the “discriminating input”. The keys themselves both solve the current model based on
the known input patterns. The whole process is achievable through the application of a series of
conjoined miters one for each known input and one extra miter for the discriminating input. In [40]
this SAT solver was shown to quickly, and with a perfect accuracy, decamouflage gates protected
by what was considered state-of-the-art protection. Some “sequential” methods for protection rely
on either a static key to ensure correct FSM transitions or an initial input sequence to program
the FSM. Both of these methods are susceptible to the SAT attack, either through the use of scan
chains or via a sequential to combinational circuit expansion referred to as an unrolling.
2.3.3 Watermarking
Watermarking, a well known IP protection scheme, passively protects circuits by allowing a user
to verify an IP’s reuse. Many watermarking based methods focus on the register assignment in
the form of graph coloring, which embeds messages into the chip [41, 42]. These messages can
identify the owner and fabricator of the IP, such that legal action can be taken, if piracy is suspected.
Given that a sizable portion of the ICs are pirated, then only a couple hundred IDs need to be
collected to determine it [43, 44].
Some watermarking techniques require a high amount of resources to redesign the IP such that each
chip is uniquely identifiable. Such methods of protection are somewhat infeasible with volume
of today’s technology. Worse off, adversaries that are capable of recovering high-level function
or even partial high-level function could redesign the chip such that the discussed watermarking
methods would be bypassed.
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2.4 Hardware Trojans
Since no Trojan has been reported publicly, many researchers rely on the hardware Trojans de-
veloped by other researchers to test detection methods. To assist in the development of unique,
stealthy, and innovative Trojans, Polytechnic Institute of New York University designed and ran a
contest in Computer Security Awareness Week (CSAW) 2008 [45, 46]. Each team developed an
array of Trojans for a encrypted communications device. Each Trojan had to pass a few inspections
(e.g. code inspection, functional testing, etc.) for it to be scored.
With the sheer volume of Trojan implementation a sizable portion of research has gone into classi-
fying and bookkeeping Trojan designs [47]. Resources have been created to give access to possible
Trojans based on research. The most commonly referred to benchmarks for hardware Trojans com-
munity is those provided by Trust-Hub [48].
Detection schemes aim to promote a particular Trojan design. Some authors claim that a linear-
feedback shift register (LFSR) is the most difficult to detect Trojan trigger via testing methods [5,
49]. However, large LFSR are easy to find in a gate level netlist. Other authors try to emulate the
effects of a Trojan (e.g. area, power consumption, etc.) [50].
2.4.1 Defenses
Many methods to prevent the insertion or in some cases the effects of hardware Trojans have
peppered research. Some methods include the use of knowledge of the correct circuit structure.
Using explicit knowledge of these “golden netlists” a variety of techniques have been developed
and tested. One such method includes [51], which leveraged timing information to check when
Trojans effect the circuits output. In the aforementioned work a circuit’s process variations were
simulated; statistical models of path delays over a set of challenge-response pairs were constructed.
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Using this model circuits could be tested and if an IC’s “signature” fell too far outside the model,
which would cause the circuit to be labeled Trojan infected. This of course is prone to errors,
especially since timing is sensitive to the temperature of the circuit at the time of testing. A more
direct approach, which work primarily on the design level, was proposed by [52], which used a
miter with a potentially Trojan Infected design and a golden model to check for any inconsistencies.
In general designers who have the full design information may compare the original design with
the reverse engineered netlist to identify whether any additional logic has been inserted during the
fabrication process [18, 21, 52]. However, this method may not apply to the commercial-of-the-
shelf (COTS) ICs and SoCs with 3PIPs because of the lack of such golden models.
A broad categorization for hardware Trojan detection is that of destructive versus non-destructive.
Methods that involve microprobing, cross-sectioning, and delayering are classified as destructive.
Like methods that recover low level IP detail from chips, ICs subjected to destructive analysis
become unusable. These methods have been used in fault analysis, hardware Trojan detection,
and IC counterfeit detection. IC analysis tools exist which involve examining just the gate-level
netlist [53]. While some destructive methods can produce ICs of this format, some gate-level
extraction methods such as micro computed tomography using x-rays can leave a IC unfazed.
For this reason such methods are classified as non-destructive. Non-destructive analysis is the
preferable option since it can be used in tandem with destructive methods, if deemed necessary.
Some hardware Trojan defenses try to deter the insertion of Trojans. As it so happens split man-
ufacturing [12, 13, 14, 15, 16] was an excellent attempt at prevention of Hardware Trojans, even
though the original goal was, in most cases, to help prevent piracy. As mentioned earlier in the
chapter these methods leveraged the fact that IC manufacturers do not necessarily need the com-
plete access to the IP to assist designers in SoC fabrication. The major issue with such methods is
that they rely on a weak attacker model. Split manufacturing either assumes that manufacturers are
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non-colluding, can’t infer from geometry the intended IC design, or don’t have other side channels
for leaking information.
Other prevention methods focus on structuring the IC such that Trojans cannot trigger or when
a Trojan could trigger, would trigger often [54, 55]. These methods assume that Trojans will be
inserted such that the trigger is based on some combination of internal wires. Then by leveraging
Automatic Test Pattern Generation (ATPG) and knowledge of the netlist, the Trojan would be
made to trigger during the testing phase, if it existed. This method leverages techniques that can
be considered both prevention and detection.
The defenses that manipulate an IC at synthesis are identified as invasive methods. Other invasive
methods hide the sensitive information on a chip by obfuscating the design. The obfuscation can
inhibit but not prevent hardware Trojan insertion. Most Trojan detection/prevention techniques
fall into the opposite category, typically referred to as non-invasive. These range from comparing
side channel information to expected values to checking equivalence of gate structures. Very few
methods, invasive or not, work without golden netlist information.
A popular detection scheme and one of the first attempts at classifying parts of netlists for the sake
of hardware Trojan detection is Unused Circuit Identification (UCI) [7]. The method focused on
finding wires that were unused in the testing phase and later omitting them. Each of the found sig-
nals is replaced with an exception throwing circuitry that triggers when the original signal would
have been activated. The thrown exception is handled by the author’s “BlueChip” software, which
is a lightweight recovery tool that emulates the triggering instruction. The method is slightly unap-
pealing since it requires access to the hardware in the design phase. To worsen UCI’s effectiveness
papers have been published that bypasses UCI [56, 8].
Broad classifications of wires and netlists have been used in many different ways. Wire catego-
rizations have been created by representing their sub-net via a low dimensional vector defined by
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their graph structure [53]. The component identification was then leveraged to help find similar
components from known hardware Trojan infested designs. These flagged parts would then be
verified which would require an in-depth examination. A major drawback to this method was that
it mainly functions as a blacklist for known hardware Trojans, which would potentially have no
effect on a 0-day Trojan design.
Logic clustering/classification via an array of tests was done in [6]. However, the accuracy of their
method’s results were never formally analyzed. In [5] wires pairs are blacklisted when particular
states are unobserved. Aside from requiring a working golden model to test IO/state spaces with, a
major drawback was the time required to simulate the circuit for finding such suspicious circuitry.
Without netlist pruning the amount of time taken to determine all possible states is quite large.
Many classification methods rely on a side channel information of the netlist. Information such
as area, power consumption, path delays, and temperature have been leveraged to detect hardware
Trojans. Multimodular netlist classification [57] has also been shown to be effective. The biggest
drawback to such methods is that they require insight as to how the original netlist golden model
should behave. This might be even harder to acquire than the actual golden model, since a detailed
knowledge of the cell library used is also required.
Path delay “fingerprinting” was used in [58]. The authors extracted the detailed information re-
garding their chips’ path delay. These few chips were verified using other slower techniques. The
extracted high-dimension path delay information was reduced to a lower dimension vector. These
vectors were then turned into a convex hull. Any IC’s path delay vector that was outside this hull
was then classified as a Trojan. Their results proved to be very good. However, their method
leaves to question how to verify. The process would be easy to use with access to the knowledge
of the original IC design, but the focus of this thesis is on protection without golden models. Other
side-channel based methods leveraged information such as delay and power consumption to de-
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tect hardware Trojans [50]. However, their results are not as meaningful as could be given that
the hardware Trojans were emulated by the insertion of extra ring oscillators, which can be much
more taxing on a chip’s resource than a simple stealthy hardware Trojan.
Methods for detecting hardware Trojans have been developed by taking advantage that hardware
Trojan triggers are rare events [52, 54, 55]. Typical ATPG is not capable of detecting hardware Tro-
jans, since they aim to find just hardware defects [59]. As mentioned earlier, the N-Detection [55]
method generates a test pattern based on known rare internal wire signals. The test patterns are
generated such that each rare signal in the netlist is triggered at least N (some pre-deteremined
parameter) times. Trojans that trigger because of some combination of internal rare signals will
have a high probability of triggering using the generated test pattern. The N-Detection method
itself requires knowledge of the Golden Netlist which might not be available. These methods have
been show to be effective on certain combinational netlists. However, Trojans that don’t utilize
internal signals (or Trojans that don’t utilize trigger signals) can bypass such protection schemes.
The perfect example of this would be an always on Trojan. In the defense of the above methods,
detection of always on Trojans can be very difficult regardless of defense depending on the Trojan’s
implementation [5].
Some methods for hardware Trojan detection rely on computer vision and/or image processing
techniques. By using information of the image garnered by the Golden Netlist a one class Support
Vector Machine (SVM) was able to detect small defects in that could have been implemented
maliciously [21]. To help prevent issues caused by process variations that can make the circuit
outline noisy some leeway was given using a buffer zone around the expected layout, which was
deemed to be reasonably within the realm of manufacturing. A ratio of the wrong material on
either side of the extended boundary was used to judge the potential for Trojan insertion. Another
method that used a SEM for layout imaging for Trojan detection was proposed in [18]. Their
method was fairly straight forward as it simply used an overlay of a golden and infected netlist
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to do classification. Both of these methods also require knowledge of the original design, which
as mentioned before might not be available. Similarly these methods require the original design’s
layout, and any IC that is functionally equivalent but implemented differently would falsely trigger
the Trojan detector since pixel differences would be almost everywhere.
In summary many Trojan detection schemes require access to the original netlists design. Currently
many methods that don’t leverage such resources tend to underestimate Trojan designers or work
on a small subset of Trojans. Lastly many researchers feel based on the generation of the IC design
a chip can be made impervious to Trojan insertion. All of these and more are reasons why the
research community lacks the ability to protect hardware. However, a strong contender for IP
verification has made its rounds recently in the hardware security domain, reverse engineering.
Reverse engineering approaches for hardware Trojan detection can use information from input
output words to stitch together the data paths that make up the netlist [60]. Using techniques
called forward propagation and backward propagation and by utilizing a modest signal comparison,
signal pairs were checked and merged into large word sets. After which by leveraging function
identification methods, a rough high-level IC design was constructed. The resulting data flow graph
could then be verified by someone that the circuit contains no suspicious structures. The authors
in [60] used the topology of the extracted word graph to estimate the tool’s accuracy. The netlist
set used to show the capabilities of their tool was a CMP router synthesized using different library
and optimization settings. The topology comparison was done manually and although the number
of words found between the different types of routers varied the authors claimed the topology
was the same across each netlist. One drawback they mentioned was that in one of the different
optimization only 4-bits of the 6-bit words were found to propagate by their heuristic, which the
authors implied meant their method was susceptible to changes in optimization parameters.
Other approaches that were a little less elegant, used known structures to perform a matching of
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IC parts to netlists. In [10] the authors examined netlist slices that contained 6 inputs. Using a
permutation invariant function matcher, the found bit-slices are grouped into equivalence classes.
Then using these classes, components were merged through two major methods either by common
signals, such as ones that could control data flow or by signal propagation, like those found in
adders. The authors also used a QBF solver and a set of known circuits to identify parts that behave
in an equivalent manner. The author’s methods were evaluated by considering circuit coverage.
Perhaps the biggest critique of this method was the failure to show how much of the coverage was
correct.
One notable reverse engineering approach work used hash of trees to determine if two signals are
similar enough to belong to the same word [11]. The method was very simplistic; to their credit
their method was much quicker than trying to match via a graph isomorphism. The authors also
provided a way to measure their method’s accuracy by examining the percentage of full words
found and fragments found. This can be misleading if complete words are found but merged
together, in a form of over grouping. Inappropriately merging two words could have a negative
impact overall on a partitioning method. The authors did not directly address this type of problem.
A more appropriate metric for analyzing clusters could have been used to evaluate the identification
of words.
As discussed earlier computer vision techniques have also been implemented for the purpose of
Trojan detection through reverse engineering netlists. The authors of [53] wanted to examine the
structural properties of netlist slices to see if they could be used to potentially identify functionality.
The authors used the topology of the netlist and normalized image segmentation to partition the
netlist. These sub-nets, by use of their graph structure and graph dot products, were turned into low
dimensional vectors. A large number of these vectors were assembled from varying IP, after which
the vectors were clustered and analyzed. The resulting clusters primarily consisted of one type
of vector coming from one netlist. Their method was a great example at an IP identification via
21
unsupervised learning. In their results it was found that some IP overlap between clusters existed,
which meant that pieces or slices of netlists were identified across IPs or there were errors. Some
of these ”rogue segments” were not thoroughly examined by the authors. The results, although
not allowing necessarily for matching each part to the appropriate function, could help detect the
presence of known hardware Trojan structures. However, the least appealing part of this method
was that novel or unknown structures could be easily mislabeled, especially when learning is done
on a small, misrepresented set of netlists.
Many reverse engineering methods either utilize high level information which is formed by as-
sumptions regarding the process for IC synthesis. Other reverse engineering methods require a
lack of novelty on the part of the attacker. The evaluation of these methods is abysmal, and there is
lack of similarity of analysis between methods that could allow for comparison which is important
since many of these methods work towards a similar goal. In short the need for these methods is
just as big as the need for a more organized structure, such as problem definition and goals. To this
end the following thesis presents a series of sub-problems pertaining to reverse engineering for IC
validation and potential solutions for such problems.
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CHAPTER 3: MOTIVATION AND ROAD MAP
In this chapter we disclose the goals, problems, and plans for accurately detecting Trojans. The
chapter also helps establish a foundation upon which netlist function recovery methods can be
discussed and numerically evaluated.
3.1 Remaining Problems
Although many papers have been proposed to assist users in the detection of hardware Trojans,
without recovery of IC functionality it becomes near impossible to determine the existence of
hardware Trojans. Highly successful methods exist that try to analyze the side channel informa-
tion, but without access to an accurate golden model detection is impossible. Due to the lack of
golden models in the general case the focus of hardware Trojan detection should fall to full func-
tion recovery. Even after function recovery analysis of the design should be carried out by an
experienced IC designer, since high-level IC descriptions can still be quite complex.
Full function recovery is quite difficult and can be broken into many parts. We are going to focus
on a small subset of problems in function recovery. The first problem being logic net versus data
net classification. The logic classification problem is rarely directly tackled, but the benefits of such
a method is great. Without a good logic detection scheme hardware Trojans can be overlooked.
This is due to the fact that hardware Trojans tend to emulate control logic. As an example a Trojan
that leaks an encryption key when a particular input is applied would need a complex comparator
and the ability to allow input signal to be diverted.
A second problem that is required for full function recovery is determining how data flows through
a netlist, and an important sub-problem related to data flow recovery is partitioning a netlists sig-
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nals into words. The latter problem can be referred to as netlist partitioning, which should not be
confused with the optimization problem presented in [61] or [62]. With knowledge of words and
how their data flows through the netlist more information can be inferred such as word manipula-
tion, and module structure. Techniques have been shown to recover module functionality based on












Figure 3.1: The proposed tool chain used for function recovery.
The last problem covered by the our proposed tool set is that of high-level logic description ex-
traction. Once the logic has been identified, higher-level function might still be necessary to find
potential logical flaws. Logic is capable of moving words and changing module behavior, so ad-
vanced netlist knowledge becomes highly desired. To meet such demands the use of FSMs can be
employed. FSMs can simply and elegantly represent complex netlist structures that might take a
long time to fully understand, if analyzed by hand and eye alone. Each state would be the state
of the netlist’s logic and transitions would be formed from the potential states achievable based on
the current state and potential inputs. A similar problem stems from FSM extraction; it might be
required to extract sequences that move from one state to another within a FSM. This sub-problem
boils down to a simplified version of ATPG. A simple solution will be discussed in more detail
later.
This list of problems is daunting to say the least. A solution to each problem will be provided. A
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high-level mappings of problems can be seen in Figure 3.1. RELIC will be used to classify netlists
as logic or data, and REBUS will be used to extract data paths. Partitioning netlists will be done
by REPCA. While, High-level logic extraction is left to REFSM.
3.2 Logic Partitioning
Being a major goal of full function recovery, the problem of logic partitioning or classification
becomes one of this thesis’ key focal points. As mentioned in Chapter 2 and earlier in this Chapter,
hardware Trojans tend to emulate logic, so detecting logic would at least allow IP consumers to
detect the wires that are most-likely to compose the Trojan module. Previous solutions to logic
classification is that of classifying registers, if they can directly or indirectly affect themselves,
in later clock cycles [64]. This is a decent first approach, but when designs are structured to be
area efficient such as an AES encryption core that uses a counter to determine the round, then the
separation of logic and data becomes obscure. To prevent this misclassification a novel method is
proposed that learns from the netlist.
The idea is based on an observation that register pairs from the same datapath will have a similar
deep logical structure. Two data registers with the same word rely on the same control logic reg-
isters to propagate their signals along the same datapath from fan-in to output. The corresponding
data signals on the datapath most-likely come from a similar logical structure from the previous
clock cycles. A similar logic structure will be present all the way to the input signals. By taking
advantage of the similarity of the data logic registers fan-in structure, we can accurately analyze a
netlist that has a datapath controlled by potentially obfuscated signals.
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3.3 Netlist Partitioning and Evaluation Motivation
Large SoCs can be easily composed of many different IPs, and even worse each IP could have
many different modules creating very large, complex structures, which would be difficult to reverse
engineer as a whole. To reduce the required effort for analyzing circuits a different approach
can be taken. Rather than attempting to determine the IC’s functionality all at once, researchers
try to analyze pieces of the netlist and then after figuring out the components try to determine
the full picture. To start this process of partial analysis it is required that accurately or at least
meaningfully breaking a circuit into pieces can be done. As mentioned previously there are many
abstractions and layers that can compose a large SoC, as can be seen by Figure 3.2. Partitioning
can be attempted at each of these levels and function/module matching could be performed for
each of these resulting partitions. This thesis will focus on word-level partitioning in gate-level
netlists. To address the issues plaguing other word partitioning methods mentioned in Chapter 2
we develop a formal procedure based on well documented clustering techniques that leverages the
exact word-level information of the original netlist. That is the resulting partition of our methods
will be compared to the original design’s intended word sets.
SoC






Figure 3.2: Simplified hierarchical of an SoC.
As shown in Chapter 2, there exist a number of ways to numerically evaluate a partitioning method.
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However, many methods introduce bias that allows certain possibly flawed methods to appear to
work well. For example, counting the number of complete words found can be very misleading. If
words A and B are found by merging all bit of A and B, we could argue that A and B, were found.
However, information of the words’ separation gets lost by this partition, so although by the metric
the method might look efficient, the partitioning method does not work perfectly. In a similar line
of thought we need to be aware that the coarse and fineness of the ground truths structure should
be taken into consideration when evaluating a method’s capabilities of partitioning.
Due to the vast differences in hierarchical structure between ICs it becomes difficult to develop
an evaluation that does not favor certain methods. To prevent this bias the method of Normalized
Mutual Information (NMI) is leveraged, which although has roots deep within information theory
domain, has been shown to be a modest method for evaluating clustering schemes regardless of the
entropy of the ground-truth [65].
Another difficulty associated with evaluation of such partitioning methods is that of mutliple in-
terpretation of ground truths. When working with the HDL, or a similar high-level language, the
ground truth partitioning becomes even more difficult to infer due to a potential reliance on seman-
tics that could change the ground truth without changing the observed netlist. Barring the potential
for multi-interpretation, we can assume that there will be only one unique ground truth partition
per gate-level netlist.
The last potential problem pertaining to netlist partitioning covered in this paper is that of multi-
membership. Such a situation occurs when a signal is shared between words. A simple example
could be circuit reduction found by the tool used to synthesize the circuit. There is always a
possibility that in a large circuit redundant signals could be merged or removed to improve IC
performance. Multiple membership could also occur when, based on certain control signals, a
wire has different behavior. Probably the worst situation for multi-membership to appear is when
27
there is a mistake in the higher-level code that somehow gets propagated through to the resulting
gate-level netlist.
A previous approach used for finding possible similarities between signals within words was com-
parison of signal graph information [10]. A major detriment to such methods is the redundancy of
certain graph or structural information. This redundancy is caused by the fact that chip synthesis
is typically performed by a deterministic protocol that optimizes a netlist structure. The computer
has a high chance of incorporating similar structure types due to a user’s desire to optimize for
some design parameters, because of the described automation process, the variance in structure
across several variables might be poor.
In [10] dimension/information reduction was simply done by leveraging graph dot products. This
reduction could allow a more accurate matching by eliminating extraneous information that could
lead to a misclassification while still preserving the potentially distinguishing information. How-
ever, for our work we plan to use a more commonly used method. One of the most common
statistical method for dimension reduction is Principal Component Analysis (PCA). Due to it’s
wide usage we leverage it as a potential solution for netlist partitioning.
3.4 High-Level Netlist Description Extraction
Many early hardware Trojans in research were emulated using a FSM. The trigger condition could
be a transition within the FSM that was rare via a large number of required input conditions,
an exact sequence of state transitions, or some set number of clock cycles which would allow IP
consumers to unknowingly avoid potential problems for potentially the lifetime of the IC. However,
with a certain sequence of commands or a single input, a malicious IP provider could gain control
over the IP in a way that could hurt the chip’s consumer. To help detect such Trojans we seek to
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extract FSMs in a netlist so that a trained IP consumer could find potential transitions or states
that are suspicious, and by double checking IC behavior could determine the chip’s integrity. The
FSM extraction is done by simulating parts of the netlist in a somewhat abstract level. The states
of the FSM become a composition of several registers at various clock cycles, and similarly the
transitions are formed by considering the states the FSM can move between for differing sets of
inputs.
When considering wires to simulate when extracting high-level details, the fewer the number of
wires the better the run-time tends to be, even when states are determined using a subset of tracked
states. To have the fastest overall runtime, only logic registers should be tracked when recovering
a netlist’s logic. Conversely, it might be the case that data registers can determine which states are
visited and can change transition conditions. Even though data might not affect the state registers
immediately, data registers have the potential to cause significant changes to state register values in
future cycles. However, some of the registers might not be pertinent to what state the circuit is in or
can visit. As an example, the value of a register which only affects output pins should probably not
be store, and, unless considered a state register, it can be removed from the simulated netlist since
it does not affect state registers. To this end we reduced the number of simulated registers, if when
extracting high-level netlist descriptions, the runtime goes above some predetermined threshold.
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CHAPTER 4: REVERSE ENGINEERING LOGIC IDENTIFICATION
AND CLASSIFICATION
To assist with IC verification through high level function recovery, a novel wire classification algo-
rithm is proposed. The proposed method, referred to as Reverse Engineering: Logic Identification
and Classification (RELIC), will leverage the gate-level netlist to output a set of wires that are most
likely to carry malicious signals.
4.1 Methods
RELIC determines the likelihood of a wire carrying logic by taking in an arbitrary netlist and pro-
ducing a list of similarity scores for each register pair. These scores allow for a classification of
registers that are important (e.g. a Trojan register or an intended chip control logic register). This
Chapter covers a method for generating similarity scores through the use of a mixture of dynamic
programming techniques and advanced graph algorithms, thereby creating a type of pseudo graph
isomorphism. However, rather than comparing against a secondary graph structure, the structures
of the netlists registers are compared against each other. This technique could also be adapted to
comparing other netlists to an original one, which can allow for custom module library identifica-
tion. RELIC also can identify intended chip logic registers by finding those registers that are not
found to be part of a data signal on any datapath. Lastly the method can help find malicious logic
inserted by others, since Trojan logic registers normally have logic different than any other original
register fan-in structure, logic or otherwise.
RELIC was developed to replace the common graph isomorphism approaches with a faster heuris-
tic by loosely comparing the topology of the fan-in logic. Due to its pseudo-isomorphisms fuzzy
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logic, RELIC can match registers corresponding to the same word with an accuracy higher than
traditional word checking methods that require the logic to meet a very specific structure. Fig-
ure 4.1 shows the work flow diagram for RELIC. It can identify registers, or even words, that are
similar, but if there is a word that is improperly connected within the chip, RELIC might allow it
to go undetected. This tool can be used in combination with other functional testing (or another
lower level tool of the sort) to verify its findings.
Simplify StructureUnprocessed Netlist Generate Pair Scores
Turn Pair Scores into 
Final Scores
Classify Registers 





Figure 4.1: Flow Diagram for RELIC
4.1.1 Preprocessing
Taking an arbitrary pair of logic vertexes (registers or logical gates) RELIC will generate values
that represent how similar their fan-in logic structure are to each other. The most obvious thing to
do is to check if the logic function used by the logic vertexes are equivalent. If this preliminary
check fails, a score of near zero is given to the pair. However, this check is too strict. As an
example, NOR and AND have similar output types, and thus it would be desirable to match them
to each other. Similarly XOR can be simulated by an OR and two AND gates. In these two
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cases registers can easily have the same logic but have varying raw structures. Thus RELIC uses a



















(b) Differing gate types.
Figure 4.2: The two FSMs recovered from the RS232 netlist.
First, when designing a netlist some gate level obfuscation might occur, either purposefully or
accidentally. Figures 4.2a and 4.2b show simple examples of functional obfuscation. There are
two main scenarios. The first scenario is when the input logic vertex has a similar AND-OR logic
to that of its parent logic vertex, and its output is not inverted (see Figure 4.2a). The second
scenario is when the input logic vertex is inverted, and it has a differing AND-OR functionality
(see Figure 4.2b), then the child logic vertex can be merged using DeMorgan’s Law. The first part
of preprocessing, the fan-in is checked for potential inputs that can be combined. If so, all wires
can then be merged, and this process is repeated until the logic vertexes cannot merge with any
of their un-merged children. Obviously no registers have their logic merged with a fan-in register,
because we assume that registers update only on an edge of the clock cycle.
Second, a color is given to INPUT, AND, OR, register AND, and register OR logic vertexes.
Additionally when checking two logic vertexes one might also want to check if the structure of the
first is similar to the inverse of the second. This can be simulated by swapping AND color vertexes
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with OR color vertexes and vice versa, in the inverted logic fan-in subgraph. This color/logic swap
can then be used as a preliminary verification that within an inversion logic of the two vertexes
have a high potential to be similar.
4.1.2 Scoring Function
RELIC generates similarity scores for an arbitrary pair of logic vertexes. Each score will fall in the
rage 0 to 1, where scores of 1 will denote identical fan-in structure, 0 will be no common structure.
These scores will be obtained by determining the similarity of all pairs of inputs between the logic
vertexes in question. A connection will be added to a bipartite graph, if the score was above a
predetermined threshold. A matching algorithm is then used to find the maximum disjoint children
pairs that are similar between the logic vertexes under analysis in the constructed bipartite graph.
Figure 4.3 shows an example of the bipartite matching of the two wires.
After finding the maximum matching of the bipartite graph, the similarity score (potentially weighted
matching of the fan-in pairs) for the given wire pair is normalized by the maximum number of in-
puts between the two logic vertexes (max(n,m), where n and m denote the sizes of the fan-in
for each wire under comparison). Re-computing similarity scores can hurt run-time performance,
especially if a logic vertex has a large fan-out set. To prevent re-computations, a dynamic pro-
gramming technique of memoization is used.
The case of infinite recursion at this point needs to be addressed. Based on the current scoring
functions, a pair of logic vertexes that each contain a fan-in path affected by their respective outputs
might not halt on RELIC. To prevent this infinite loop from occurring a user defined depth, d, is also
passed into each of these score queries. This depth is reduced by 1 in each recursive function call,
and if the current depth is zero, then the return score is the smaller number of children (min(n,m))
over the larger number of children (max(n,m)) The pseudo-code for RELICs main procedure is
33
described in Algorithm 1.
i











Figure 4.3: Conceptual weighted matching of two wires i and j, where the thicker lines represent
the maximal weighted matching.
The run-time for this algorithm can be easily determined. Each pair of logic vertexes will be
checked at most d times. If Score(i, j, k) was already computed, the Dynamic Programming
technique of memoization would return the previously computed value. The worst case run-time
becomes d × N2 × O(MAXMATCHING), where N is the total number of logic vertexes in
the netlist. Since maximum matchings run-time is polynomial, so RELICs run-time is polyno-
mial, which is one additional advantage RELIC has over traditional graph isomorphism based
approaches.
Once the similarity scores are obtained a simple classification is performed to identify logic reg-
isters. Each register has a counter initialized with zero, and for each similar pair of logic registers
34
(register pairs that have a similarity score above some pre-determined threshold), the logic registers
respective counters are updated. Registers with high counters (above some pre-determined value,
normally 0) are selected as non-logic affecting registers. In addition when scores were found to be
one the number of comparisons were reduced by duplicating the scores across the board between
the two values.
Algorithm 1 Compute similarity score between two logic vertexes in a graph, with indexes i and
j, using a given depth, d, of their fan-in subgraphs.
1: function GETSIMILARITYSCORE(graph, i, j, d)
2: max← MAX(graph[i].numChildren, graph[j].numChildren)
3: min← MIN(graph[i].numChildren, graph[j].numChildren)
4: if graph[i].color 6= graph[j].color then
5: return 0
6: end if
7: if d = 0 then
8: return min / max
9: end if
10: Let G be a graph with a node for each child of i and j
11: for a ∈ graph[i].children do
12: for b ∈ graph[j].children do
13: simScore← GETSIMILARITYSCORE(graph, a, b, d− 1)
14: if simScore ≥ Threshold then




19: return MAXMATCHING(G) / max
20: end function
4.2 Results
A collection of netlists, including AES, MC8051, RS232, RSA, s349, and AES-128 were used to
benchmark the performance of RELIC. For testing purposes RELIC used a depth of 7 on every
netlist, except the MC8051 netlist which used a depth of 5. With 100% sensitivity of recovering
the control logic registers, the overall accuracy was about 90% except in the instance of RS232.
Detailed results can be found in Table 4.1 and the two low-accuracy cases of RS232 and MC8051
are discussed below. All simulations were run on a desktop of a 3.40 GHz Intel i7-4770 processor.
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Table 4.1: RELIC Run-time and Accuracy Results
Netlist Name Registers Gates Meta-graph Threshold Accuracy % Run-time
RS232 Transceiver 59 168 .8 79.6 2 s
32-bit RSA 555 2139 .8 95.3 3 s
MC8051 µP 578 6590 .9 89.1 10 s
AES-128 3968 12576 .8 100 240 s
The MC8051 proved to be very challenging. Due to the size of the fan-in trees a smaller depth was
used. This small depth caused many pairs of registers to have higher scores than what they should
have. To combat this shift towards a denser Meta-Graph a higher threshold was used. After the
parameter changes RELIC using the Meta-Graph heuristic identified 63 registers with the potential
to be logic registers. All intended logic registers were in this subset. Since the MC8051 is a micro-
processor and much of the netlist is used for logic, which causes many unique structures. However,
for the sake of high level instruction handling behavior recovery only 3 registers were selected as
the ideal logic registers, which causes a low accuracy.
The RS232 core was an example of a netlist that can potentially have poor results when run on
RELIC. The most notable problem this netlist had was that about one third of the registers were
classified as being potential state registers. Only one tenth of the total registers are, semantically
speaking, state registers. We can try to reduce error by changing the threshold but it still leaves
about a fifth of the registers being false positive. The first problem when recovering the logic in the
transceiver is the small size of the netlists. A large percentage portion of registers depend on the
logic registers at varying depths. This caused many registers dependant on the logic to be falsely
classified as logic.
A second issue is due to the structure of the RS232 chip itself. RS232 is the concatenation of
two independent modules into one chip. This can cause the registers to be improperly identified
as being similar to each other from different modules. These false positives can make the actual
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similarity harder to detect. This false matching can be prevented by using methods similar to those
used in other papers, such as WordRev [60], but using such methods could hinder RELICs ability
to remove obfuscation.
4.3 Discussion
This Chapter presented a novel polynomial time method for classifying control logic registers
and data registers from an arbitrary, and potentially obfuscated, netlist. The significant advantage
RELIC has over previously proposed methods for register classification is its ability to use the
given netlist as a reference when determining data words. This allows RELIC to bypass most ob-
fuscation techniques and accurately determine and group word registers. By using max-cost-flow
and dynamic programming RELIC was able to quickly classify medium size netlists. The prelimi-
nary results show that this method works on a large number of netlists with different structures and
libraries. As a secondary function the given procedure can be capable of grouping together logic
with similar functions, which can help a user when attempting to determine the full functionality
of a chip.
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CHAPTER 5: REVERSE ENGINEERING WORDS VIA PRINCIPAL
COMPONENT ANALYSIS
For solving the problem of partitioning a netlist into a higher level structure we looked to leveraging
common clustering techniques. This Chapter discusses a method that leveraged the structural
information of each signal and the dimension reducing properties of PCA to estimate the original
intended word sets of the netlist.
5.1 Methods
Each signals’ initial numerical information for the PCA based netlist partitioner was derived via
certain structural data, examples of which are fan-in set sizes and fan-out set sizes both at various
depths in the gate-level netlist. It is possible that the same signal can belong to multiple sets, see
Figure 5.1 for an example. Other fields consisted of gate type (OR, AND, XOR), and temporal
logic type (flip-flop or not). We also kept information regarding the number of clock cycles for
primary input to affect the gate and the number of clock cycles for the gate to affect a primary
output. Other netlist distances leveraged include the closest flip-flop in the fan-in tree and closest
flip-flop in the fan-out tree, both of which are measured by the number of non-buffer/inverter gates
between the signal and selected flip-flop. Also leveraged was a small set of similarity scores,
derived using the procedure in Chapter 4, (in our tests we selected five wires to compare against)
extracted from the wires within the netlist under examination.
After generation of the principle components the first npca components are used for comparison
of signals. For the comparison a simple distance metric is used to determine membership, where
two points are within the same word, if the euclidean distance between the two points are less
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than pre-determined cut-off. To determine the appropriate distance used for membership cut-off a
random set of edges are selected. A ratio of edges that are included within words compared to the
total number of edges is generated by an expected number of words in the final partition. Although
it might not be the case, by assuming the inter-word signal distances are always smaller than the
intra-word distances and that the number of signals per word are constant, then the ratio can be
approximated by one divided by the expected number of words.
Depth of 1 gate
from X
Depth of 2 gates
from X
X
Figure 5.1: A simple example of the structural information that can be extracted from a gate-level
netlist.
Based on this expectation and also on a the desired number of clusters a distance is selected from
the sorted set, which acts as a good edge length cut-off. A sweep is then performed over the set of
signals. Like the pairwise logic classification method, when a random signal is found to not be in
a word, the signal is used to start a new word. Any signals found to be within a specified estimated
distance is then joined to the word. A KD-tree can be leveraged to prune out signal pairs that are
too far apart, reducing the overall runtime. Once each signal has been handled, the word sets are
returned. This process can be seen by Algorithm 2.
As discussed in Chapter 3, the technique for evaluation of partitioning methods used in this is
NMI. The method itself is quite simple and has been used frequently for clustering evaluation,
which again makes it an obvious choice when selecting an evaluation method considering in some
sense netlist partitioning is a form of clustering. As in [66] the formulation of NMI of a partition
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P and ground-truth T can be expressed as
Inorm(T, P ) =
I(T, P )
H(T ) +H(P )
(5.1)
where I(T, P ) is simply the mutual information and H(X) is a type of entropy that normalizes I .
Both of which can be calculated by the following equations,





|T ci ∩ P cj |log(
|T ci ∩ P cj ||T |





|Xci |log(|Xci |) (5.3)
where C(X) is the number of classes in partition X , |T | is the total number of element or nodes in
the partition, and Xci is the set of the i-th class of partition X .
The value returned by the NMI is a real number in the range [0, 1]. The closer to 0 the worse off
the partition is compared to the ground truth, while a NMI of 1 would be an exact match. As an
example if a partition where all wires are in the same cluster is compared against a ground truth
with at least two clusters, then the resulting NMI is 0 as no information is recovered from the
partition.
5.2 Results
To show the significance of this method we compare the resulting NMI to that of another approach
that attempted to partition the netlist into words. The approach compared against searched for
logic word that could potentially behave like a Trojan [6]. The approach used information of
control signals to partition the netlist. Signals that had a common input signal would be grouped
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together, and conversely, signals with differing input signal sets would belong to different words.
Algorithm 2 Determine the word sets of a netlist with a set of signals S, given their principle
components, pc, a desired number of words, nw, a scaling factor α, and a distance metric, d.
1: function GETWORDSET(S, pc, nw, α)
2: randDistances← ∅
3: i← 0
4: while i < α× |S| do
5: a←Random x ∈ S
6: b←Random x ∈ S
7: randDistances← randDistances.append(d(a, b))




12: ε← randDistances [bindexc]
13: words← ∅
14: seen← ∅
15: for Random x ∈ S ∧ x 6∈ seen do
16: seen← seen ∪ {x}
17: X ← ∅
18: for y ∈ S ∧ y 6∈ seen do
19: if d(pc [x] , pc [y]) < ε then
20: seen← seen ∪ {y}
21: X ← X ∪ {y}
22: end if
23: end for





AES 0.09s 0.46s 0.21s
MSP430 0.18s 0.71s 0.53s
MC8051 0.28s 0.89s 0.49s
RSA 0.06s 0.17s 0.15s
Table 5.1: Time taken for various control signal based partitioning
However, this method then requires some form of high level information: control signals. Barring
this a user would not be capable of recovering the functionality. The authors claimed that the
control input of a MUX gate would be an example of such a signal, but with limited gate types,
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IP consumers might not be privy to the information of what constitutes the control signal of the
netlist. To allow such an approach to be leveraged we examined all the signals that could affect
output or registers, and those with the highest fan-out set was selected as a control signal. Since
there could be a number of signals that could be selected for control signals we simply choose the
first n signals that had the highest output size, where n was some predefined number. Since each
different value of n could create a different partition and a different NMI, we let n be anywhere
from 1 to 400 and computed the NMI based on the result. Each of the minimum and maximum
achieved NMIs are compared to the NMI that were computed over the different parameters used




























Number of Control SignalsControl Sigsnals
AES MSP430 MC8051 RSA
Figure 5.2: NMIs found using control signals on RSA, AES, and MC-8051 netlists.
The PCA based method was also, with a limited parameter set, capable of outperforming the
control signal based method in terms of NMI. PCA, like logic classification and bus based methods,
was unable to overtake control signal based partitioning as seen in Figure 5.6. As one would expect
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PCA has its best accuracy when the expected number of words passed to the program is close to
the ground truth’s number of words. However, in practice guessing the correct number of words
might be difficult, and PCA’s performance suffers when the expected number is too low, as can be
seen by Figures 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6. By leveraging the distributions of distances the expected
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Figure 5.3: Cluster Scores found using PCA based partitioning methods compared to control signal
based matching on the flattened AES-128 netlist.
Table 5.2: Average time taken for the PCA based partitioning method shown alongside the number
of Flip Flops (FFs) and the Ground Truth’s (GT’s) entropy and word count
Depth 2 3 4 5 6 FF Pins GT Entropy GT Words
AES PCA 23.9s 23.8s 23.9s 23.8s 23.9s 6720 5.36 405
MSP430 PCA 0.90s 0.91s 0.89s 0.88s 0.93s 734 4.33 133
MC8051 PCA 1.44s 1.40s 1.53s 1.49s 1.50s 578 4.47 121
RSA PCA 0.83s 0.86s 0.87s 0.88s 0.83s 295 2.53 16
Aside from NMI, we also examined the difference of time taken for the control signal based heuris-
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tic versus that of REPCA. The Control signal based method’s run time can be seen in Table 5.1.





























PCA 2 PCA 3 PCA 4 PCA 5 PCA 6
Control Max Control Min
Figure 5.4: Cluster Scores found using PCA based partitioning methods compared to control signal
based matching on the MSP430 netlist.
5.3 Discussion
In each netlist REPCA has its best result with the correct expected number of words. REPCA
tends not to vary much with the depth used in the RELIC variable. However, the runtime does not
vary much from the chosen parameter either. It appears that either the PCA or the comparison part
has the larger overhead. In many cases REPCA outperforms the control signal based scheme even
when the expected number of words is far from accurate. However, it should be noted that control
based signals appears to work extremely well on smaller netlists, achieving a much higher possible
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Figure 5.5: Cluster Scores found using PCA based partitioning methods compared to control signal
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Figure 5.6: Cluster Scores found using PCA based partitioning methods compared to control signal
based matching on the RSA netlist.
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CHAPTER 6: REVERSE ENGINEERING DATABUSES
This Chapter focuses on presenting a novel method for recovering the data paths from a gate level
netlist utilizing metrics proposed for logic classification in combination with forward propagation.
The method used is commonly referred to as Reverse Engineering Databuses (REBUS). The pro-
posed method will do so without the use of an external source that specifies component structure.
6.1 Methods
IC reverse engineering should not solely distinguish data from logic, and access to the expected
number of words or the number of inter-word edges might not be available. For these reasons we
shift focus to determining how data moves through the gate-level netlist. Reverse Engineering Data
Buses (REBUS) finds datapaths, by utilizing the forward propagation method from WordRev [60]
to assist in producing high level netlist descriptions. Prior method relied on a library of known
function types to help identify the type of data transference. This identification also provided the
ability to group wire together by the word data they contained.
REBUS uses the same scores generated by the logic classification method, and along with the
concept of forward propagation in [60] tries to extract the data path in a netlist. The method could,
due to the reduced number of comparisons, have a significantly better run time than the original
logic method. This chapter will like the methods of Chapter 5 examine both the time and accuracy
of the method on various types of netlists.
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6.1.1 Signal Propagation
RELIC was designed to perform general classification of signals into either logic or data. RELIC
did so by utilizing a pairwise comparison of signals to achieve a high confidence in the uniqueness
of wire fan-in structures. The shear volume of the operations needed to completely classify just
medium sized netlist causes RELIC to have poor a runtime performance for the simple task it
performs. However, other approaches in research take advantage of a common theme across IC
design that can reduce the potential number of function calls for comparing wires.
Algorithm 3 Determine the word sets of a netlist with a set of signals S, given a similarity score
threshold, t, a similarity score depth d, a set of input words W , and a similarity score function f .
1: function BUSBASEDPARTITION(S, t, d,W )
2: words←W ∪ {{x}|∀w ∈W (x ∈ S ∧ x 6∈ w)}
3: q ← ∅
4: for w ∈W do




9: for pair ∈ q do
10: x← pair.first
11: y ← pair.second
12: for xo ∈ fanout(x) do
13: for yo ∈ fanout(y) do
14: if (f(xo, yo, d,T) > t ∨ f(xo, yo, d,F) > t) then
15: X ← X ∪ {y}
16: wx ← (w ∈ words ∧ xo ∈ w)
17: wy ← (w ∈ words ∧ yo ∈ w)
18: for x1 ∈ wx do














The comparison reduction comes from the abstract concept of a databus or datapath that moves
information from one part of a netlist to another. Taking this concept into consideration REBUS is
able to outperform the original RELIC in terms of speed. Aside from the standard inputs required
from the original logic classification method, REBUS needs a set of input words to seed the word
set. An extension to the method could leverage a set of output words to potentially find correct
word pairs starting from the output with the use of backwards propagation. Regardless the method
adds in the pairs of known word signals to a queue. While there are unresolved pairs within
the queue the method will try to find new word pairs. For forward propagation the fan-outs are
examined from the known word pair.
Algorithm 4 Determine the word sets of a netlist with set of signals S, given a similarity score
threshold, t, a similarity score depth d, and a similarity score function F .
1: function PAIRWISESIMSCORE(S, t, d)
2: words← ∅
3: seen← ∅
4: for x ∈ S ∧ x 6∈ seen do
5: seen← seen ∪ {x}
6: X ← ∅
7: for y ∈ S ∧ y 6∈ seen do
8: if (F (x, y, d, T ) > t ∨ F (x, y, d, F ) > t) then
9: seen← seen ∪ {y}
10: X ← X ∪ {y}
11: end if
12: end for





When two wires are chosen for examination each pair of wires within the fan-out are compared,
and if the signals under-inspection do not belong to the same word, the score between the two
wires in question is evaluated. Since some registers could be storing the complement of the signal
the comparison is done within a broad negation. If the resulting score is above some threshold, the
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words of the correpsonding signals are merged. Any new signal pairs from the created word will
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Figure 6.1: Cluster Scores found using pairwise method and REBUS compared to control signal
based matching on the flattened AES-128 netlist.
To emphasize the difference of quality between REBUS and RELIC in terms of word extraction
RELIC is extended to allow for word extraction. The RELIC extension will be referred to as the
pairwise partition, or pairwise method, throughout this section. The pairwise method was created
by using a near pairwise comparison of signals, while utilizing a representative signal to seed
words. Direct pairwise comparisons can be quite slow, but they should be the most thorough. The
work flow for the proposed partitioning scheme is as follows. A signal that has not been grouped
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to a word yet will be selected at random as a seed signal. For each signal within some specified
threshold of the seed signal, that has not already been added to a different word, we will add it to a
current word. Then the current word is added to the set of known words. Since sometimes a signal
might store the negation of the word and leverage the not pin of a register, we will allow comparison
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Figure 6.2: Cluster Scores found using pairwise method and REBUS compared to control signal
based matching on the MSP430 netlist.
On the results for the AES core, seen in Figure 6.1, both the pairwise partition’s and REBUS’s NMI
were highly stable; neither vary much with the given threshold. REBUS had a better result than
the RELIC’s pairwise comparison based scheme, and both methods were capable of outperforming
the control signal based partitioning. The pairwise comparison method on MSP430 in Figure 6.2
had results that varied on both the threshold and the depth parameter. The higher the depth or the
higher the threshold the better the performance, and although REBUS had a higher performance
on average, the pairwise method had the best performance for a certain parameter combination.
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Also seen in Figure 6.2 both the pairwise comparison method and REBUS were capable of outper-
forming the control signal based method. However, RELIC’s pairwise comparison scheme only
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Figure 6.3: Cluster Scores found using pairwise method and REBUS compared to control signal
based matching on the MC-8051 netlist.
The MC-8051 core also showed that REBUS and the simple pairwise comparison based partition-
ing schemes could outperform the control signal baseline (see Figure 6.3). It should be noted that
once again REBUS was more consistent, but with certain parameters logic classification was able
to overtake the bus scheme in terms of NMI. However, in the last netlist, the RSA core, both RE-
BUS and pairwise RELIC had lower maximum NMIs than the control signal based method (see
Figure 6.4). Not only was control signal based partitioning better, but unlike in the other three
netlists REBUS always achieved a lower NMI than the pairwise RELIC method. In short, on the
small RSA control signal based partitioning performed the best. This might be caused in part by a
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Figure 6.4: Cluster Scores found using pairwise method and REBUS compared to control signal
based matching on the RSA netlist.
By far the fastest method found was to be the control based signal partitioning, see Table 5.1. It
was capable of running over 100 times faster than any of the other methods on certain netlists
and no netlist took longer than a second to execute. While the bus based method might not be as
accurate, it is capable of running in a fraction of the time compared to slower methods such as the
pairwise comparison, in part due to its limited comparisons, see Table 6.1. Due to memory issues
the pairwise comparison based method had a very poor performance on the AES core.
6.3 Discussion
REBUS is a very efficient method in terms of runtime and accuracy. It is an unsupervised method
capable of estimating the word-level partition. REBUS tends to work best for netlists that are of
a moderate size. The smaller the netlist the more difficult it can be for unsupervised methods that
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try to match. However, since REBUS utilizes a method that looks for words, it will not be able to
partition netlists with varying degree of hierarchical structure. For higher levels of partition PCA
based methods would probably be best due to the ability to change the expected number of clusters,
which could help merge words from the same module.
Table 6.1: Average time taken for our netlist partitioning methods shown alongside the number of
FFs and the GT’s entropy and word count
Depth 2 3 4 5 6 FF Pins Entropy Words
AES Pair 146s 385s 1291s 4578s - 6720 5.36 405
AES REBUS 11.4s 9.88s 11.5s 15.1s 19.6s 6720 5.36 405
AES PCA 23.9s 23.8s 23.9s 23.8s 23.9s 6720 5.36 405
MSP430 Pair 4.16s 5.49s 6.82s 7.91s 8.98s 734 4.33 133
MSP430 REBUS 0.30s 0.39s 0.48s 0.56s 0.649 734 4.33 133
MSP430 PCA 0.90s 0.91s 0.89s 0.88s 0.93s 734 4.33 133
MC8051 Pair 1.30s 1.97s 2.65s 3.19s 3.82s 578 4.47 121
MC8051 REBUS 0.33s 0.38s 0.42s 0.54s 0.68s 578 4.47 121
MC8051 PCA 1.44s 1.40s 1.53s 1.49s 1.50s 578 4.47 121
RSA Pair 1.29s 1.88s 2.45s 2.64s 2.84s 295 2.53 16
RSA REBUS 0.63s 0.70s 0.70s 0.63s 0.68s 295 2.53 16
RSA PCA 0.83s 0.86s 0.87s 0.88s 0.83s 295 2.53 16
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CHAPTER 7: REVERSE ENGINEERING FINITE STATE MACHINES
Many sequential hardware Trojans can be represented as and FSM. Moreover a Trojan developer
might use part of an already existing FSM to aid in the trigger. To help verify the integrity of a
gate-level netlist we propose a tool to recover the full logic FSM. With the aid of an experienced IC
user the netlist can be examined in a more meaningful manner than otherwise would be possible.
To this end a software executable was created which is referred to as Reverse Engineering Finite
State Machines abbreviated REFSM.
7.1 Methods
REFSM attempts to recover the control logic from a gate-level netlist and present to the user a
higher-level description. A general outline of REFSM is shown in Figure 7.1. The netlist is first
collected either from chip level reverse engineering or from the IP provider. The end user is then
required to initiate the process and modify the recursion depth if run-time becomes an issue. Since
designs can contain hundreds of thousands of gates or more, the first step is to reduce the number
of gates to be analyzed by identifying and isolating FSM registers.
7.1.1 Logic Graph and State Registers
REFSM starts by creating the logical graph from a flattened netlist. The graph contains edges
from inputs/registers to registers/outputs. Since REFSM determines the potential states of the
registers, the outputs will not be considered. Any logic that is output exclusive is removed from
the graph. What remains is logic from inputs and registers that can affect other registers either
directly (register at time t can vary from register state/input at time t− 1) or indirectly (register at
55
time t may vary based on register state/input at time t − k, where k > 1). Potential state registers











Construct FSMSplit FSM(s)Simplified FSM(s)
YES
NO
Figure 7.1: The flow of the REFSM method.
7.1.2 Prune Graph
As mentioned earlier pruning out registers helps reduce the time for FSM extraction. The call
to remove registers is tough, so all registers that affect logic registers (directly or indirectly) are
considered important. Only if the amount of possible states becomes too large, REFSM will prune
some potentially less important registers. Our implementation considers both ‘0’ and ‘1’ (or Don’t
Care (DC) typically denoted as X) as potential values for each “unimportant” register. Checking
and storing each one of these can take time, but certain assumptions about the graph can also
reduce the number of states that need to be considered.
56
The aforementioned pruning process involves a Breadth First Search (BFS) through the netlist up to
a maximum distance of δ from the set of state registers. This precomputation is used to produce a
smaller subset of the netlist, which allows for an estimated register state graph in a reasonable
amount of time and memory usage. However, in case that the current δ still causes program
problems, δ will be decreased by user to run the algorithm again. The δ reduction process is
performed until a state register graph is produced. Analysis can then be performed on the resulting
graph to recover control flow and/or to detect malicious logic.
7.1.3 Evaluate State Space
After generating a pruned graph, REFSM searches for all possible states of registers that are achiev-
able by using the function GetRegisterStates (see Algorithm 5 in the Appendix). The given netlist
is represented by a set of Boolean logical expressions, EXPS, and a set of false and true values
(‘0’ and ‘1’) to represent each state that the registers can take on. The only registers that are listed
in each state are those which were determined to be important in the prune step. The queue is
initialized with the reset state (resetState). Meanwhile, the set of seen states (N) also contains
the reset state to prevent reusing it again. By looping through all elements in the queue all possible
register states are generated. A single iteration starts by pulling out the first element in the queue.
A new set of expressions is generated by filling in all the values currently in the register state. As an
example, if the register is set to be true (value ‘1’) in the current state, then when making the new
expressions from the netlist all variables relying on the register’s output will be recalculated ac-
cordingly. This new expression is sent into the 3-SAT function, FETCH, for evaluation and returns
the set of all achievable register states using the given expression. The GETREGISTERSTATES
function constructs an FSM graph by searching for any states not included in the graph, and then
evaluating which states they can reach. Each new state is added both into the queue and into N .
The overall run-time is O(|N |2 + |N |2#inputs).
57
Algorithm 5 Find an FSM graph given a set of expressionsEXPS from a flattened netlist and a starting expression
set resetState
1: function GETREGISTERSTATES(EXPS, resetState)
2: Let FSM be an empty graph G(N,E)
3: Add the resetState to the Queue; Set N to {resetState}
4: while Queue 6= ∅ do
5: Get a currentState from Queue
6: currentExp← EXPS.LastState(currentState)
7: F ← FETCH(currentExp)
8: for nextState ∈ F do
9: if nextState /∈ N then
10: Queue.add(nextState)
11: N ← N ∪ {nextState}
12: end if






19: if exps contains no variables then
20: return {exps}
21: end if
22: x← first variable in exps
23: newExps← exps.set(x, false)
24: F ← Fetch(newExps)
25: newExps← exps.set(x, true)
26: F ← Fetch(newExps) ∪ F
27: return F
28: end function
As a key part of the function GETREGISTERSTATES, the FETCH function starts by checking the
expression for unassigned variables. If there is a variable that has yet to be assigned and the
variable can affect the outcome of the expression, the FETCH function will need to decide what
value to use. Otherwise, it will return the expression as it is. If there were unassigned variables, the
FETCH function will randomly pick one of them, set its value to ‘0’, check the outcome recursively
and add it into the resulting expressions. The function will then set the variable to ‘1’, check the
outcome, and add the resulting expression into the output. After going through all variables, the
function will then return all identified states.
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The complexity of the FETCH function operation isO(2n) in the worst case, where n is the number
of variables that can change. In practice, due to the structure that many netlists follow, there are
few variables that have a significant effect on the outcome of the next state. Most of the states
searches terminate at a depth of 8 or less in our experimentation. This makes the number of visited
states less than 256. Further, many of the inputs perform a similar function so if one is set to
‘1’, the others no longer need to be checked. For example given x variables AND-ed or OR-ed
together, the number of decisions that need to be made becomes x+1. Although the computational
complexity of the Fetch function appears daunting, it normally can be run in a reasonable amount
of time such that the total run-time for REFSM becomes very low (See Table 7.1).
7.1.4 FSM Decomposition
After deriving the global FSM, some extra steps for further analysis of the recovered control logic
may be required. Determining simple transition conditions is one task that REFSM performs. This
enables users to find suspicious transitions. A more important task is separating local FSMs from
the global FSM, which is referred to as FSM decomposition and is described below.
For demonstration purpose, we consider the case that two independent FSMs (F1 and F2) were
merged (composed). This results in pairs of states (α, β) of the merged FSM, where α is from
F1 and β is from F2. Each pair of transitions that originate from the individual states should be
traversable. The edges leaving the state (α, β) will contain at least the Cartesian product of the
reachable states from state α and β. More formally
{α, β|α ∈ V (F1) ∧ β ∈ V (F2)} ⊆ V (F1 ×F F2)
{((αi, βi), (αj, βj))|(αi, αj) ∈ E(F1) ∧ (βi, βj) ∈ E(F2)} ⊆ E(F1 ×F F2)
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where ×F denotes composition of FSMs. Since the FSMs are independent, it should also be the
case that any node within the merged FSMs should correlate to two FSMs in the original graph.
Otherwise the original FSMs would not contain all possible reachable states. Similarly Any edge
from the merge FSM must correlate to transistions from the original independent FSMs. We can
then say the following
V (F1 ×F F2) ⊆ {α, β|α ∈ V (F1) ∧ β ∈ V (F2)}
E(F1 ×F F2) ⊆ {((αi, βi), (αj, βj))|(αi, αj) ∈ E(F1) ∧ (βi, βj) ∈ E(F2)}
Using these results it can be inferred that the merged FSM will be the tensor product of the original
FSMs.
It should be noted that there have been algorithms which can decompose the tensor products on
undirected, unlabeled, connected graphs into unique prime factor decompositions (UPFD) in poly-
nomial time [68]. However, to decompose a merged FSM involves directed graphs and appears to
be a harder problem. Therefore a heuristic-based approach is used to take advantage of the register
labeling to split the graph into UPFD.
The basic idea is to assume that each pair of registers is originally independent. Then look for
contradicting sets of independent registers (either by vertex label or transition topology) and merge
the found sets together until all register sets can properly construct the original FSM using their
tensor product. Algorithm 6 lists the detailed description of the used algorithm.
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Algorithm 6 Returns a partition of an FSM given a set of registers, R, and an FSM graph G(N,E)
1: function SPLITFSM(R, G(N,E))
2: Let P = {Pi|Pi is the Partition containing register i}
3: Assume no register depends on a register other than itself.
4: for i, j ∈ R such that Pi 6= Pj do
5: Let Gi(Ni, Ei) be the FSM dependent on i
6: Let Gj(Nj , Ej) be the FSM dependent on j
7: Let G′(N ′, E′) be the FSM dependent on i and j
8: if there exists u ∈ Ni and v ∈ Nj and (u, v) /∈ N ′ then
9: Pi ← Pi ∪ Pj ; Pj ← Pi
10: else
11: if there exists e ∈ Ei and l ∈ Ej and (e, l) /∈ E′ then







REFSM was capable of fulfilling many roles for the sake of reverse engineering; extracting high
level details of a netlist’s logic, finding Hardware Trojans within gate level netlists, and detereming
unlocking sequences for sequentially encrypted circuits was carried out by REFSM. The following
section shows its use.
7.2.1 Extracting Logic
In order to verify the effectiveness and the scalability of the developed REFSM tool, we applied the
tool on various circuit designs ranging from small-scale ASIC designs to medium and large-scale
microprocessors. As we will demonstrate shortly, the control logic within all these testing circuits
are recovered successfully in the format of finite state machines. The experimental tests are run on
a desktop with Intel i7 quadcore and 16GB memory. The average run-time for different circuits
are listed in Table 7.1.
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Table 7.1: REFSM Run-time Results
Netlist Name Registers Gates Run-time
RS232 Transceiver 59 168 1 s
32-bit RSA 555 2139 < 1 s
MC8051 µP 578 6590 39 s
SPARC µP 119911 232978 600 s
For small-scale and medium-scale circuits, our algorithm can reconstruct the circuit control logic
from a flattened netlist in less than 1 minute (less than 1 second in most cases). The run-time is
below 10 minutes even for large-scale circuits. From Table 7.1, we can also find that in general the
REFSM would have a larger computation time for larger circuits. However, the complexity of the
control logic will affect the computation time. For example, 32-bit RSA Encryption [48] circuit
finishes faster than the smaller RS232 transceiver due to the RSA circuits more regular circuit
structure.
The RS232 transceiver includes two sub-modules for data transmitting and data receiving. The
sub-modules including the transmitter and the receiver work independently without interfering
with each other. In addition, they have their own input/output pins at the top module. However, the
flattened netlist does not maintain the circuit hierarchical structure and there is no clear boundary
between them. Therefore, the selection of an RS232 circuit is ideal for verifying the capability of
REFSM in isolating different FSMs from a flattened netlist.
Using the flattened RS232 netlist as the input, our REFSM tools recover the control logic in the
format of FSM of the entire circuit. Figure 7.2 shows the recovered global FSM which contains
25 unique states with quite complicated transmission conditions among these states. This FSM,
although containing the entire functionality of the RS232 circuit control logic, is almost meaning-
less to users and testers due to its complexity. However, the FSM decomposition component of
REFSM can help simplify the FSM structure.
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Figure 7.2: The extracted FSM from the RS232 transceiver.
Using the recovered FSM in Figure 7.2, the developed FSM decomposition tool can isolate in-
dependent states from the entire FSM. In this case, two independent FSMs, Figure 7.3a and Fig-
ure 7.3b, are separated from the control logic in Figure 7.2. To validate the correctness of the FSM
decomposition results, we build the real FSMs of the receiver and transmitter submodules in the
RS232 circuit (see Figure 7.4a and Figure 7.4b) which are identical to the recovered FSMs both in
available states and in all state transition conditions.
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(a) First decomposed FSM. (b) Second decomposed FSM.
Figure 7.3: The two FSMs recovered from the RS232 netlist.
The reason we used the 8051 microprocessor is to show the potential of REFSM in dealing with a
highly-complex circuit structure. The source code of the 8051 microprocessor is written in VHDL,
where each instruction will take up to three clock cycles to complete [69]. Based on the RTL
code, we first constructed the real FSM when dealing with different instructions (see Figure 7.5a).
We then synthesize the circuit and generate the flattened netlist of the 8051 microprocessor. The
flattened netlist is then used as the input of the REFSM, which then recovers the control logic
from the netlist. The recovered netlist is shown in Figure 7.5b. A comparison between Figure 7.5a
and Figure 7.5b shows us that these two FSMs are of the same structure. In fact, the transition
conditions are also identical.
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(a) The receiver FSM. (b) The transmitter FSM.
Figure 7.4: The two FSMs extracted from the RTL of the RS232 transceiver.
7.2.2 Trojan Detection
The capability of REFSM for control logic recovery can also help detect hardware Trojans which
are triggered by a specific input sequence, so-called sequential Trojans. Compared to the hardware
Trojans that rely on only combinational logic to be triggered, sequential Trojans are much more
difficult to activate and can evade many hardware Trojan detection methods such as [70, 55, 54].
However, since the behavior of the sequential Trojan triggering mechanism can be modeled as an
FSM with the specific input sequence serving as the transition conditions, REFSM can help rebuild
and isolate the Trojan FSM. From this circuit users/testers can easily identify the Trojan logic as
well as the Trojan triggering conditions.
For demonstration purposes, a Trojan-infected cryptographic platform is used [46]. The platform
is an FPGA implementation designed to perform all necessary operations for cyphertext transmis-
sions through public channels. The user inputs data via a keyboard attached to a PS2 interface.
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(a) The RTL FSM.
(b) The REFSM FSM.
Figure 7.5: The FSM Recovered from MC8051 Netlist and RTL.
This text is displayed through a VGA port onto an attached monitor. The user then initiates the
encryption of the data entered via a button on the FPGA board. The encryption used is an 128-bit
AES encryption core; the user also has the ability to select up to 16 different encryption keys by
changing a combination of four switches on the FPGA before initiating the encryption sequence.
Once encryption is finished, the user can then send the encrypted data through an on-board serial
port.
In this design a Trojan was inserted in the top level module that uses a finite state machine to
read a specific input sequence from the user, via the keyboard. Once the sequence is entered, the
activated hardware Trojan will leak the AES encryption key through the serial port. The Trojan
trigger seems simple, but this hardware Trojan can evade many detection methods [70].
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Figure 7.6: The extracted Trojan Logic from the case study.
However, if we can identify all states of the Trojan FSM, determining the the actual behavior of
the Trojan becomes apparent. Using the state space exploration techniques presented, all FSM
states and transitions were correctly identified by the REFSM, as well as the correct conditions of
the inputs for each transition. State diagrams were constructed of the edge-lists for the recovered
FSMs. Figure 7.6 shows the recovered FSM of the inserted hardware Trojan and its triggering
conditions. The letter on each transition curve shows the keyboard input which will enable the
transition among these states. While the REFSM tool will not tell us whether the recovered FSM
is genuine or malicious, users/testers can easily identify the suspicious logic and conclude that the
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special input sequence, ‘New Haven’ in this case, is outside the design specification and therefore
potentially a hardware Trojan trigger. Users may validate their findings by triggering the suspicious
circuit by inputting the special sequence.
Besides the elaborate example, we also applied our solutions to the hardware Trojan benchmarks
from Trust-Hub [48]. Table 7.2 shows some of the testing results from which we can find that the
REFSM tool can help detect hardware Trojans with sequential trigger and/or sequential payload in
seconds.
Table 7.2: Run-Time and Trojan Detection Capability on Trust-Hub Benchmark
Benchmark Trigger Recovered? Run-time
AES-T100 Always On Recovered 18 s
AES-T400 Plaintext = Recovered < 1 s
128’hffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff





b15-T400 Address = 8’hFF Recovered < 1 s
s38584-T100 Scan Enable Mode Recovered < 1 s
MC8051-T200 pcon (control mem) = 1’b1 Recovered 90 s
7.2.3 Unlocking FSMs
Sequential encryption schemes often focus their efforts on the implicit logical FSM. The straight-
forward approach increases the FSM’s state space thereby reducing access of the original FSM. In
addition access to the circuit’s true logic can require a particular sequence of input vectors. Other
methods incorporate special locking states in the updated FSM. These methods select a subset of
states that can be accessed by the new reset state but cannot reach the states of the original FSM.
68
Two main methods for increasing the state space exist. The first method changes the logic of the
registers to utilize previously unreachable states. The other method involves inserting additional
registers that usually but not necessarily act as flags for the FSM’s behavior. Additional registers
tend to be very appealing since the state space increase exponentially with the number of inserted
registers. The major detriments to a large number of register insertions is the time to unlock, area,
and power overhead.
An example of sequential circuit encryption, HARPOON, inserts additional state elements (SE)
and combinational logic that adversely affects the behavior of the netlist while the circuit is locked.
The inserted SEs control the activation of the inserted combinational modules, that have the po-
tential to corrupt parts of the netlist. Moreover HARPOON’s FSM’s state space is partitioned into
three general sections (modes): obfuscation, authentication, and original. The obfuscation mode,
the first part of the obfuscation mode, corrupts parts of the netlist. The authentication mode sim-
ply watermarks the netlist. The original mode, as it sounds, does not corrupt the netlist’s internal
signals and allows for normal execution. The authors assume that an attacker would randomly re-
verse engineer the netlist which gives the defender a large probability of protection, but a smarter
solution exists based on their protection method.
Attacking the HARPOON protection requires first identifying the registers associated with the
netlist’s mode control. In general finding inserted registers partially reveals the function of the
chip’s logic. Several techniques can be used to extract these registers.
The first method that can be used was a register classification tool, RELIC [67]. RELIC itself is a
tool used to separate parts of the netlist based on implicit features that are induced when including
either extra logic or circuitry. RELIC finds repetitive wire patterns by examining the correlation
of a wire’s structural variables (e.g. fan in size, distance to input/output wires, etc.). The outlying
wires tend to fall into the category of logic due to the nature of how netlists are synthesized (i.e. a
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fixed protocol replicates structure within data words). RELIC might not be capable of finding all
the inserted registers in one try. To compensate RELIC is used to find partial register sets, and the
sets expand via register dependency.
The second method stems from the register set expansion technique mentioned in the first method.
With the process RELIC itself is removed from the equation, and the register dependency becomes
the sole method for “classification”. This is done by way of Tarjan’s Strongly Connected Compo-
nents (SCC) algorithm [71]. The algorithm finds what is commonly referred to as the transitive
closure of directed graphs. The algorithm and properties are well detailed in other resources. The
graph returned contains a set of vertex sets that represent SCCs of the original graph, which is
potentially connected by a set of directed edges that denote how the original graph’s components
interact. The graph itself is directed and acyclic (see Figure 7.7).
The Strongly Connected Component graph can also be used to attack more recent protection
schemes such as DSD (Dynamic State-Deflection. DSD [37] relies on inserted, persistent logic
that is unaffected by the original logic (or original data for that matter). Thus Tarjan’s algorithm
can detect these inserted state flip-flops. When observing the FSM and the transition probability
generated by these inserted FFs the correct state becomes obvious. In general the components that
are analyzed are those that contain no incoming edges (i.e. source SCCs). Source SCCs will exist
because the graph is acyclic (and presumably non-empty).
Once found, the inserted registers are used by the REFSM tool to construct a partial FSM of the
netlist. For protection schemes such as HARPOON the desired FSM section (i.e. original mode) is
the authentication sequence’s “end”. The end is found using Tarjan’s SCC algorithm. The FSM is
broken down into its components, and the component(s) without outgoing edges (i.e. sink SCCs)
are analyzed. If multiple sinks exist, the one selected is typically the component that has the
lowest reachability probability, as the others are probably black-hole states (i.e. states that exist
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to trap incorrect sequences). These black-hole states are typically included in other protection
methods. REFSM then can be used for ATPG by generating the shortest input sequence to enter
a state within the supposed normal mode FSM. This test pattern can be used to verify REFSM’s




Figure 7.7: A graph which is partitioned into its three SCCs. The first being the only source SCC,
and the third being the only sink SCC.
The best chance a user has at improving HARPOON without overhauling the method is to increase
the complexity of the FSM. With a large enough FSM it becomes infeasible to extract the unlocking
sequence. The major concern with this approach is the incurred overhead. Aside from power and
area increase due to the increased number of SEs, the major drawback is the time the circuit takes
to unlock from power-on.
Alternatively users can incorporate other defense techniques. Although this would also not nec-
essarily ensure protection, it would definitely make reverse engineering even more difficult for
adversaries. A typical defense that has been prevalent in current research is the use of gate cam-
ouflaging. Even though methods exist that can break standard gate camouflaging, the mixture of
methods can slow down or even halt IP piracy.
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7.3 Discussion
This paper proposed and evaluated a method for reverse engineering the control logic from a gate-
level netlist. The algorithm designed and implemented showed promising results with reasonable
run time on standard desktop computer hardware. For every test, all states were successfully
identified along with their correct state transitions and conditions leading to near perfect FSM
reconstruction. In addition, the developed tool helps identify sequential hardware Trojans which,
otherwise, would be very difficult to detect through existing testing methods. We expect that the
developed tool will be widely implemented in other hardware security areas. Nevertheless, one
shortcoming of the developed tool stems from the fact that all tests were to compare the FSM
implemented in RTL source code with the recovered FSM to verify the correctness. Manually
analyzing the RTL source code to construct a FSM can lead to possible errors or incomplete state




Due to the state of the IC production chain and its economy the threat of hardware Trojans has
grown significantly over the the past few years. Many different methods for implementing and
inserting hardware Trojans are available to malicious IC developers. The task of determining the
purity of IP cores is left to the consumer. Prevention and detection methods exist, but many of them
are lacking and detection has begun to rely more on reverse engineering techniques. Full function
recovery has become a major goal for Trojan detection. However, the sub-problems associated with
full function recovery has not been well defined, documented, or analyzed. To this end we propose
several heuristic based methods to assist in furthering the pursuit of hardware Trojan detection and
prevention by solving common sub-problems which can be associated with full function recovery.
We also automate these method and test them against common gate-level netlist both with and
without hardware Trojans.
Distinguishing logic from data can be considered a highly sought after task when searching for
hardware Trojans. Since many Trojan designs involve manipulation of a FSM, determining the
logic of a netlist can narrow down the search for the most common types of Trojans. To address
this concern we proposed a tool called RELIC that used a recurrent comparison on gate-level fan-in
structure to determine the similarity between different signals within a netlist. RELIC then sums a
threshold function of the returned scores and uses these sums to pseudo classify logic versus data.
By leveraging various dynamic programming practices RELIC was able to achieve a reasonable
runtime.
A reverse engineering problem tangent to logic signal classification is that of signal partitioning.
Methods that rely on word-level or module-level information to extract high level details motivate
researchers to improve partitioning methods, but with limited research that analyzes the accuracy
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of partitioning, the area has somewhat stagnated. We develop our own methods for partitioning
netlists, REPCA, and by way of NMI, a common clustering evaluation technique, we are able
to determine the efficiency of such methods. The resulting partitions were then compared against
another notable method for partitioning by way of NMI. Along the same thread, REBUS, a method
for extracting high-level features using databuses, was developed and similarly compared with
known partitioning schemes. To more directly display the use of REBUS over similar schemes,
we compared its result and time to that of a pairwise, brute-force RELIC solution. Both REPCA
and REBUS were capable of outperforming the previously proposed method especially on larger
netlists or netlists with a greater degree of data.
The last major reverse engineering problem addressed in this thesis was that of high-level logic
extraction. Since many Trojans emulate the logic of a FSM, we developed a method, REFSM,
that, when given a netlist, a library description, and a desired word, returns the netlist’s behavior
with respect to the word in the form of a FSM. To help reduce the complexity of the resulting
FSM, as some FSMs might be the composition of multiple independent FSMs, REFSM utilizes a
heuristic to decompose the FSM into smaller pieces, which can allow for a more accurate analysis.
To show the effectiveness of the method we used it to extract several FSMs from Trojan infected
netlists, and we found that REFSM was able to accurately extract the Trojan transitions. Further,
in netlists without Trojans REFSM accurately extracted the full FSM even when the netlist was
locked using simple FSM based obfuscation. The deobfuscation leads us to believe that hardware
locking researchers needs to take into consideration stronger attack models when developing their
solutions.
In conclusion this thesis has proposed four methods for gate-level netlist function recovery. The
first method presented was RELIC a broad classification tool that leveraged the pairwise structural
information to find logic. The second method REPCA used generic signal structure to create a
partition of the netlist. The third method REBUS utilized forwarded propagation techniques and
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combined it with the similarity score function from RELIC to extract data flow from the netlist.
Logic was recovered in a high level description from the netlists which was of the form of a FSM in
the last tool discussed. These methods will hopefully motivate researchers to produce better reverse
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